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Just as Ronald A. Kuipers knew of me from my book on Rorty, I knew of him 
from his; the best general book on Rorty’s philosophy there is, in my view (see 
Kuipers 2013). And just as he reports having felt some trepidation when first 
confronted by my title, Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I felt some trepidation 
when I first opened his commentary; knowing that he works at the Institute for 
Christian Studies. It turns out that neither of us had much to worry about. Well, 
he does report having ‘let [my] version of nihilism trouble [his] sleep’ (p. 52); for 
which I apologise! But nevertheless, I was delighted to discover that he sees a 
substantive common ground between our positions, which ‘resides in the context 
of a difference that makes a difference,’ but which still provides plenty of scope 
for us to ‘continue a communal conversation’ (p. 52). I agree. That is what I want 
to happen and I think this symposium marks the beginning of our contribution to 
it. It was particularly refreshing and gratifying, when reading Kuipers recount my 
position, to discover that he has seen exactly where I am coming from. Refreshing, 
because this will allow me to hit the ground running in our conversation; and 
gratifying, because he takes the position seriously. 
Now maintaining both that we occupy a transcendent reality and that nihilism 
is true, places me in a tight critical spot within today’s philosophical culture: 
because those sympathetic to the former are very unlikely to be sympathetic to the 
latter, and vice versa. But that strikes me as a major bonus, rather than any kind 
of disadvantage, because it allows me to talk to both sides. If I had wanted a 
glowing, uncritical reception, then I could have knocked out one of those 
‘Ditchkinian’ books Kuipers mentions, using the very same title, and I reckon I 
might well have received it; along with a hostile and highly critical reception from 
the other side (if they could even be bothered). It is on the ground between these 
sides, however, that new thinking can occur, new alliances can be forged, and 
entrenched oppositions can start to degrade and transform; not good if you think 
one of the sides already has it all right, but I do not. I have not been so influenced 
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by Rorty’s pragmatism that such tactical considerations informed the 
development of my metaphysic, I hasten to add, for although it would make Rorty 
howl, the fact is that I was just trying to work out the right answers. But 
nevertheless, I am very pleased with where I have landed; for the aim is to develop 
philosophical thinking – and for helping out with that, it is a very useful place to 
be. 
My aims and resources are quite different in relation to the two sides, by 
which I mean, very roughly, physicalists and believers in a meaningful reality. My 
resources for dialogue with physicalists are plentiful, because I used to be one and 
I retain their main instinct: that we must give full, undiluted credence to objective 
thought. But physicalism embodies a false metaphilosophy, since science cannot 
determine a credible metaphysic of reality. My aim, like others of my generation 
who have not focused on the meaning of life, is to bring about the extinction of 
physicalism. In my case this is not just because I think it is false, but also because 
I think the unchecked conviction that science must determine our metaphysic, 
coupled with indifference to what that metaphysic actually amounts to – as 
embodied in the physicalist doctrine that reality is ‘whatever contemporary 
physics says it is’ – threatens to downgrade and diminish philosophical discourse. 
And as I hint at the end of Meaningless, and will argue at length in its sequel, this 
is an outcome no sane person could wish for; not if they had really thought it 
through. But rejecting the half-baked and insidious metaphysic of physicalism is 
no obstacle to giving full, undiluted credence to science, in my view, since it was 
never supposed to determine a metaphysic. Philosophy and science are different. 
It was a bad, but entirely dispensable philosophical idea to try to merge them. 
Liberated from this idea, the philosophers it has seduced can reconnect with the 
heart of their tradition and put stultifying scepticism about their own discipline 
behind them. 
It is exactly this aim with regards to physicalism which provides my main 
resource for dialogue with believers in a meaningful reality; even though 
‘transcendence’ obviously provides the headline attraction. For my book is 
essentially an affirmation of philosophy: an affirmation of our ability to say things 
about the world which science cannot say, which are rational, and which answer 
to legitimate matters of human curiosity (cf. Kuipers 2002). Since physicalism 
closes down the space in which believers in a meaningful reality can talk about 
the things they want to talk about, and is the main intellectual force in our world 
which pushes such talk to the boundaries, my energies in this regard should surely 
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be very welcome to this side. It is just a shame, I imagine them thinking, that upon 
reaching transcendence, I ruin the plot with nihilism. Despite this sticking point, 
however, my opposition to physicalism and affirmation of philosophy still must 
at least earn me a hearing. So what do I want to say? What are my aims with 
regard to this side of the debate? I must admit that I had thought considerably 
more about my aims for the other side, but Kuipers has inspired me to now answer 
this question. 
Do I want to persuade them of nihilism? Well, yes and no. The answer is ‘no’, 
to the extent that Meaningless does not set out to persuade people who think that 
God provides life with meaning that they are wrong. I am fully aware that there 
are many sophisticated arguments for the existence of God, and any reader of the 
book cannot fail to notice that I do not engage with any of them. There is an 
endnote in which I say that I think my transcendent hypothesis provides good 
reason to be suspicious of any kind of cosmological argument, and that I consider 
this the most promising line of argument in the area (PML, p. 191). I also say 
throughout the book that I think belief in a meaning of life is to be expected given 
natural human desires, the patterns of explanation within the framework, and the 
transcendence of reality. But nevertheless, if my aim had been to dissuade people 
of their belief in a transcendent context of meaning, then I clearly wrote the wrong 
book.  
Primarily, I was trying to increase metaphilosophical self-consciousness, 
vindicate the question of the meaning of life, undermine physicalism, solve 
problems which physicalists cannot solve, and thereby provide an affirmation of 
philosophy. One of my many subsidiary aims was to persuade people that the 
meaning of life is not provided by social meaning; but this critique was directed 
to the other side, since substituting social meaning for the relevant kind is just the 
kind of thing physicalism primes you for. Believers in a meaningful reality should 
welcome this critique, especially since advocates of the ‘meaning in life’ agenda 
typically contend that even if God did exist, it would be irrelevant to their issue; 
which strikes me as one of the more conspicuous absurdities within the debate – 
and a very telling one, as regards the real motivational drivers of physicalism. My 
concern with nihilism was predominantly expounding, rather than establishing it; 
within an intellectual culture where it has been marginalised as an ominous threat 
which nobody would or should pay much attention to, unless of course they were 
confused, depressed, destructive, or had a remedy to offer. And in the course of 
expounding it, I tried to show that it is legitimate, plausible and very 
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philosophically interesting. 
On the other hand, however, the answer must in a sense be ‘yes’, since I think 
nihilism is true. I think that once we get clear about nihilism, we see there is 
nothing wrong with it, and that a lack of clarity on this matter understandably 
skews people’s judgements. I think that metaphysically, at least, transcendence is 
all that the meaningful reality side was ever driving at – and that they were right. 
And I think that my metaphysic, taken as a whole, gives good reason to think that 
we cannot escape the rootedness of our cognition in objective thought, and hence 
that there can be no good reasons to make the kind of positive assertions about 
transcendent reality which this side does sometimes make. In philosophy, if you 
think your view is right, then you obviously want to persuade anyone who will 
listen. But aims come in different shapes and sizes. 
To see what I mean, consider the following example; selected in order to be 
so obviously far removed from the topic at hand that unintended connotations will 
not be invoked by the specific content. Suppose you think that your friend’s 
attachment to a certain brand of car is unjustified; you do not think they are 
particularly good. You are both car-enthusiasts, so you like to talk cars together; 
he knows what you think and vice versa. Given this point of contention between 
you, the topic of ‘that brand’ is bound to keep coming up; but there are many other, 
related things for you to talk about. You would like him to come around to your 
point of view, of course, even if you do not remotely expect this; but you certainly 
would not try to force the matter. For you only want him to come around if he 
wants to; rather as you would not want to be forced to grudgingly concede to him. 
This is because you are both convinced. This does not mean that you have closed 
your mind on the matter. For you are open to a revelation that takes you by surprise 
and makes you see the brand in a whole new light; just not tiresome, vaguely 
familiar considerations, which you might not know how to overcome at present, 
but which nevertheless leave you convinced that you doubtless could answer them, 
given the time and inclination. Only something genuinely new would change your 
mind about that brand. But there are many other things to talk about, in a world 
where people hold views on cars which you both find outrageous. So do you aim 
to persuade your friend that his brand is no good? Only half-heartedly and in good 
humour. 
That is pretty much how I feel in relation to the meaningful reality camp. I 
have no revelation to offer them, and I doubt they are going to find one for me. 
When I lay out my position, it is only in a half-hearted attempt to persuade them 
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on this matter; in stark contrast to my aims with regard to physicalists. Now this 
conciliatory, rather apathetic stance, might seem disingenuous on the grounds that 
the meaning of life is such an important topic; as my own book argues at length. 
But actually, what is primarily important to my aims in the book is the question, 
about which I see eye-to-eye with this camp. I think my answer to this question 
provides considerable philosophical insight, but I am not looking for converts 
from this side. I can see that I would care more if I thought reality was meaningful, 
but that is good, since if what I said inspires others to try to persuade me, we may 
both learn in the process. Moreover, if you think reality is meaningful in a good 
way, then you presumably think that this is the most important thing in the world; 
the meaning is where all the importance of the world resides. Even if I am right 
that nihilism is evaluatively neutral, then, from their starting point, the transition 
to nihilism is bound to be a serious downer in the short term. So why would I want 
to go out of my way to bring about such a transition? Who wants to be Richard 
Dawkins (qua philosopher)? 
It is the other side that I am really concerned to bring around to nihilism; to 
open them up to the question to which it provides an answer – an answer which, 
if they took the problem seriously, they would already be conducive to. The 
meaningful reality side is already open to the question, which has come to seem 
like their sole preserve. But I want to make it available to both sides, thereby 
widening the space for philosophical debate and speculation which physicalism is 
trying to close down. This would benefit everyone. Within this space, there is 
room for all kinds of positions on all kinds of topics; including positive views 
about the meaning of life. So on reflection, I think, my main aim with regards to 
the meaningful reality side is to bring them into dialogue with the mainstream of 
philosophy which physicalism has unfortunately seized; so that we can all talk 
about questions of natural philosophical interest from our differing perspectives. 
Were this to transpire, then I would be on the other side with regards to nihilism, 
and whenever the idea of a meaningful reality was brought to bear on other topics. 
But now the lines of opposition would have changed; they would have come 
together within a more unified discipline. 
With these aims in mind, I shall turn to the comment on spirituality I make on 
the last page of Meaningless, since it provides the focus of Kuiper’s paper (PML, 
p. 184). I suggested that there is something spiritual about reflecting 
philosophically upon our meaningless, transcendent reality. I was deliberately 
cautious in saying that this is the ‘most sense’ I can make of spirituality, because 
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the flat-footed will remind me that you can hardly be spiritual if you do not believe 
in spirit; at which I would immediately concede their flat-footed point. And yet 
the meanings of words move on, and I readily know what is meant when it is said 
of certain musicians that their music passed through a more ‘soulful’ period, or 
that they tapped into the ‘spirit of Africa’. Thoughts about immaterial substances 
and communal souls do not cross my mind; I think of a sound and where it came 
from, and if more than this is sometimes meant, that is tangential as far as I am 
concerned. Now when, in philosophy, we try to rationally think about reality 
beyond the objective thinking and social framework that dominant our lives, this 
does indeed strike me as the kind of thinking which might aptly be called ‘spiritual’ 
these days. It is the kind of thought which tries to get some kind of rational grip 
on the ‘something else’ which all kinds of people who think of themselves as 
spiritual are reaching for. That is why I said it; it is an underutilized and extremely 
attractive selling-point for a discipline with a very bad image-problem. When I 
said that ‘everything takes on a new significance’, I meant a philosophical 
significance; that is the kind of spirituality I favour, and the only one I really 
understand.  
I am very glad to see that Kuipers thinks I used the right word, for he says 
that, 
 
There is, indeed, something very spiritually edifying about Tartaglia’s 
stated refusal to impose human-made meanings on life itself [...] Tartaglia’s 
position, that when we search for this kind of meaning to life itself we find 
none, has the spiritual benefit of encouraging us to cease imposing our finite 
human meanings on that which we have not made, on a world that 
transcends us. It encourages us to assume an attentive form of spiritual 
comportment that suspends this feverish activity, and instead puts us in a 
receptive posture. (p. 67) 
 
The last sentence gives me pause, but up until that point, he captures my intentions 
almost exactly; I would qualify ‘cease imposing our finite meanings’ with ‘except 
when they are philosophical, and thus suitably sparse.’ The last sentence would 
be okay too, if the ‘attentive form of spiritual comportment’ and ‘receptive posture’ 
just meant openness to philosophical understanding. But Kuipers means more, as 
is made clear here: 
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If we decide that the only meaning available to us is of [the] self-imposed 
variety, then we have already chosen to relate to the universe that surrounds 
and transcends us in a way that by definition precludes it from having any 
kind of voice or summons that could speak into our question. (p. 65) 
 
And here we see the basis of Kuiper’s critique. He thinks I have made a similar 
mistake to the one which my qualified endorsement of spirituality offers a remedy 
to. For the reason I endorse nihilism, in Kuiper’s view, is that on achieving the 
important insight that we must stop looking for a self-imposed meaning to life, I 
subsequently draw on human-made meaning to steer me to nihilism. Instead, I 
should have stopped short at the point where I reached his ‘receptive posture’, on 
the grounds that, ‘even if it is true that the transcending universe or cosmos 
responds only silently to our question, no answer is not the same thing as the 
definitive answer “no”’ (p. 62). 
Kuipers thinks my commitment to nihilism is a step too far, then. He thinks I 
should have rested with an openness to other kinds of meaning, and wonders if I 
would consider retracing my steps in order to return to a point at which we ‘put 
ourselves into the sort of receptive posture whereby we can once again become 
beings who are and can be questioned by life’ (p. 68). Thus he closes his paper by 
saying, 
 
Tartaglia leaves his reader enough space to wonder, however, whether or 
not his practice of philosophy as a kind of spiritual exercise has brought 
him right up to the threshold of the very space in which a human being 
might once again become open to receiving a meaning that he did not 
simply construct or impose. (p. 68) 
 
Now Kuipers and I are both actively thinking into the same space; that much is 
clear. The question is whether I am still open to hearing something within that 
space; to passively receiving it. To this, my answer is ‘yes’; and yet I am not 
actively listening out for anything. I am not listening out for the doorbell at the 
moment, but if it rings, I will hear it. If reality is transcendent, I could in principle 
hear intimations of its meaning; this is possible on my metaphysic, unlike that of 
the physicalists. For reality might be meaningful, and it might be able to convey 
its meaning to us in a manner which the framework and objective thought makes 
it hard for us to hear. But I am not hearing anything. And if I did seem to, I would 
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endeavour to rationalise it away. Only if I failed in this, but found that I could 
rationalise what I heard in a new way, would I take it seriously.  
I do not hear anything in Frankl’s report of his ‘spirit piercing through the 
enveloping gloom’ and transcending the ‘hopeless, meaningless world’ within 
which he found himself imprisoned (p. 64), not because I am insensitive to the 
feeling expressed in this passage, but rather because I find these kinds of claim 
easy to rationalise away in terms of the framework and objective thought. To even 
begin to spell out this kind of rationalisation would be insensitive in this case; but 
Kuipers and I both know the kind of things that could be said – clearly the 
phenomenology of Frankl’s experience, and the sense that he gave to it, could 
have happened just the same way if nihilism were true. We were not always able 
to rationalize such voices away, however. It is perfectly understandable that 
people have thought, and still do think, that the meanings within our lives are the 
central focus of a reality in which something watches over us; or that they are part 
of a nature that has its own contiguous meanings which we should listen out for. 
It was natural, before Copernicus, to think that we were at the physical centre of 
reality; and it was natural, before Darwin, to think that we were at the centre of 
the phenomenon of life on earth. But it turned out, as a matter of fact, that we 
were wrong on both counts. These facts were exactly not things we primed 
ourselves for and hence made ourselves hear. They took us by surprise. 
Now I could hardly be more enthusiastically in agreement with Kuipers than 
when he says, as I would put it, that our desire for power led to us finding ways 
of manipulating reality, and hence that we came to conceive of it in accordance 
with how we could best manipulate it (pp. 66-7). That is a central topic in the 
sequel I am writing. But recognising this motivation does not devalue what we 
learnt in the process. It is not that the human desire for power deafened us to 
voices that are really there, but rather that as an offshoot of developing objective 
thought in this manner, we learnt that the voices are not there. Kuipers says that 
my trust in the deliverances of objective thought is just as much an ‘article of faith’ 
as the religious believer’s assumption that transcendent reality speaks to us (p. 66). 
But there is no faith involved in believing what you have firm inductive evidence 
for; as P.F. Strawson said, in effect, this is a major and inviolable component of 
what being ‘rational’ means (Strawson 1952). The voices are simply not there in 
the objective world. And we cannot discover anything new in this regard from the 
metaphysical insight that the objective world is transcended. Yet I grant Kuiper’s 
point that ‘no answer is not the same thing as the definitive answer “no”.’ 
 78
Consequently, I take my definitive ‘no’ from a combination of objective thought 
and metaphysical reflection. I find that we have no reason to think our notion of 
meaningfulness has application to transcendent reality; and that incomplete as it 
is, objective thought provides our best guide to the nature of that reality. That is 
definitive enough for me; idle possibilities do not need to be ruled out. 
This is the kind of reasoning I am relying upon, then, but perhaps it is 
deafening me to another ‘take’ on reality which is superior. To assert this, however, 
is to provide a reason to give up on the reason I am relying on; and I cannot see it 
as a good one. For if there is another kind of reasoning which would side-line both 
objective thought and the kind of bare metaphysical reflection on transcendence 
which I engaged in, thereby allowing me to hear what reality is saying, then the 
superiority of this new reasoning would have to explain and usurp the old; 
otherwise I could never rationally accept it as superior. Listening out might 
provide me with this new way of reasoning, thereby allowing me to hear what 
reality is saying. But my old reasoning provides me with no reason to actively 
listen out, because I am not expecting to hear anything. I could do it anyway, in 
the hope of receiving some kind of revelation. However, if there is something to 
be understood of the prerequisite enormity, which would explain the meaning of 
transcendent reality in such a way as to encapsulate and usurp both objective 
thought and metaphysical reflection of the kind which reveals to me only the bare 
fact of transcendent existence, then I would have thought the only place I am 
likely to hear it is in a philosophy book. And quite frankly, I would be amazed if 
there really were something of this magnitude in extant philosophy which has 
entirely evaded my notice.  
So I have no reason to give up on the reasoning I am relying on in order to 
make myself more receptive to something else. The reasoning I am relying on 
gives me no reason, and the new reasoning cannot provide that reason unless 
either somebody tells me what it is, or it somehow occurs to me. Actively listening 
out is not going to make the latter happen, however, because I have absolutely no 
idea what to listen for; without the new reasoning at my disposal, I am simply not 
going to hear anything. So I should do nothing more than remain open to a new 
discovery; which I always try to do anyway. Perhaps the injunction to actively 
listen out is rooted in emotion rather than reason. But I cannot help it if I do not 
feel it, and without the new reasoning at my disposal, I have no reason to think 
that it makes any difference to my job as a philosopher. 
Kuipers asks whether I would bracket ‘joy, wonder, or gratitude’ (p. 58) as 
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attunements akin to boredom and anxiety? I see what he is driving at – perhaps I 
have been taken in by existentialist gloom in privileging these two. But 
nevertheless, I do think they are special. Joy shows a natural propensity to engage 
with the framework. But does it creep over us when the framework recedes, 
thereby revealing something about our basic situation? Is there a joy in simply 
existing? I do not think so; it depends on the context in which you are existing. If 
you are frustratingly isolated from your framework goals while locked in a prison 
cell, boredom is inevitable, but not joy; a rush of joy when you realise your inner 
resolve not to let your present circumstances beat you, sounds like the call of the 
framework to me. Wonder also seems dependent on circumstances; you need 
something to inspire wonder. Simply existing may be enough in our more 
philosophical moments, but even then, this seems to be a product of the 
framework goal to understand. And gratitude, of the kind Kuipers has in mind, 
just strikes me as an imposition from the natural patterns of explanation we 
employ in the framework; something is good, so gratitude has to be expressed to 
somebody. Boredom and anxiety, on the other hand, however unpleasant they may 
often be, do strike me as philosophically illuminating responses to our basic 
situation; for the reason that they are a product of our projection into the 
framework losing its hold, and can thus reveal that projection to us. 
To return to the main thrust of Kuiper’s paper, then, I do not think I am going 
to hear anything. I am pretty sure that I do not think this because I have bought 
into unjustified assumptions that block my ears; I can hear just fine, but since I 
am not expecting to hear anything, I am not actively listening out. I would only 
have my ears to the ground, and recommend this attitude in my philosophy, if I 
thought there was good reason to expect to hear something; when in actual fact, I 
think there is very good reason not to expect to hear anything. Nevertheless, if I 
did hear something which I could not rationalise away, such that I was instead 
inspired to rationalise what I heard, then I fully grant that this could be amazing; 
I would love to read the book I would then write – so long as it was not the product 
of me losing my marbles. I am convinced this will never happen, but I am certainly 
open to a big surprise, especially if it is a good one. So I have an open attitude, 
just not the active one Kuipers recommends. This is a point of contention between 
us that we can continue to debate; and hopefully find things to say that others will 
find interesting. But to my mind, at least, this pales into insignificance against the 
fact that we are both thinking into a space which many other philosophers are 
missing out on – and because they are missing out, they are being inspired to say 
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things which are not only false, but detrimental to philosophy. Judging from his 
paper, I think Kuipers might just agree; if so, I put it down to our shared 
background in Rorty. 
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